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Emerging market ¯nancial crises are abrupt and dramatic, usually occurring after a period
of high capital °ows and high investor con¯dence, for example, the Asian crisis followed the
Asian miracle. This paper develops an equilibrium asset pricing model with informational
frictions in which the vulnerability and crisis are consequences of the investor con¯dence built
in the period preceding the crisis. The model features two sets of investors, domestic and for-
eign, and informational frictions are introduced as follows: foreign investors are imperfectly
informed about the true state of the emerging economy (asymmetric information). Foreign
investors have noisy information about the true state of productivity, which contains infor-
mation relevant for returns from equity. These investors solve a signal extraction problem in
order to formulate expectations of the state of productivity conditional on the noisy informa-
tion, called \beliefs". Depending on the noisiness of the signal, foreign investors' beliefs over
or underestimate the true productivity of the economy. The numerical analysis shows that,
if preceded by a sequence of positive signals, a small negative noise shock can trigger a sharp
downward adjustment in investors' beliefs and asset prices. The magnitude of this downward
adjustment increases at an increasing rate with the level of con¯dence obtained prior to the
negative signal. Moreover, with the introduction of the informational frictions, asset prices
display persistence in response to transitory shocks and the misperceptions of foreign investors
have ampli¯ed e®ects on asset prices.
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The emerging capital markets are vulnerable to signi¯cant shifts in investors' con¯dence in both
upward and downward directions. More interestingly, downward shifts in con¯dence and ¯nancial
market collapses are abrupt often taking place after a period of con¯dence building and boom.
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) document that \sudden stops", sharp negative reversals of capital
°ows, are usually preceded by a surge in capital in°ows. In this paper, we present a model in
which the vulnerability and crises stem from the high investor con¯dence in the pre-crisis period.
The key ingredient of our model is informational frictions, motivated with the observation
that emerging economies tend to follow non-transparent policies. Lack of transparency, that
manifests itself by inaccurate and misleading data, has been documented to be a characteristic
of emerging economies, becoming particularly prevalent in the pre-crisis periods. IMF (2001)
reports that \... A lack of transparency was a feature of the build-up to the Mexican crisis of
1994-95 and of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. In these crises, markets were kept in the
dark about important developments and became ¯rst uncertain and then unnerved as a host of
interrelated problems came to light. Inadequate economic data, hidden weaknesses in ¯nancial
systems, and a lack of clarity about government policies and policy formulation contributed to a
loss of con¯dence that ultimately threatened to undermine global stability ..."
The model features two types of investors, domestic and foreign. Domestic investors are
consumer-investors, who maximize the expected present discounted value of their lifetime utility.
Foreign investors face trading costs and maximize the expected present discounted value of pro¯ts
from investing in the emerging equity market.
We model the informational frictions as follows. Domestic investors have access to \better"
information about the state of the economy than their foreign counterparts.1 Foreign investors
can only partially infer the true state of productivity, which contains information about the
returns in the capital market. In every period, foreign investors observe dividends, a noisy signal,
and update their beliefs about the current state of productivity. The dividends consist of two
parts: a persistent component, which we interpret as productivity, and a transitory component,
1For an alternative modelling of the informational frictions, see section 6.3 where we solve the case in which
both sets of investors are imperfectly informed. We ¯nd that the main results of the paper are robust to these
alternative informational structures. Hence, the crucial assumption is not the heterogeneity of information, but
the imperfection of information.
1which is a noise term.
Foreign investors' demand for equity depends on their perceptions about the productivity of
the emerging economy. When they receive a negative signal, they turn pessimistic and decrease
their demand for equity. The magnitude of their response to this shock varies depending on their
current beliefs. If the negative signal comes after a period of positive signals and as a result it
\challenges" their beliefs, their response is abrupt and large. If the signal \con¯rms" the beliefs,
the e®ects of the shock are smaller.2
Domestic households are modelled as risk averse consumer-investors. The signals are in the
form of dividends, hence a low signal is the same as a low dividend income. Without any
informational frictions (full information), domestic investors lower their demand in response to
this negative noise (and income shock) due to the consumption smoothing motive.
Informational frictions produce an e®ect working in the opposite direction with the consump-
tion smoothing motive. If the transitory shock is such that the beliefs are \challenged" and assets
are considerably over or underpriced, then domestic investors would like to exploit their oppor-
tunity for capital gains using their informational advantage. In other words, if the assets are
underpriced due to misperceptions of foreign investors, domestic investors know that prices will
be at least partially corrected in the following period with a very high probability. Hence, they
would like to increase their equity holding in the current period and decrease it in the following
periods as the foreign investors start correcting their beliefs. Their incentives for capital gain are
stronger when the transitory shock is such that the beliefs of foreign investors are \challenged"
and the assets are signi¯cantly under or overpriced. In these states, capital gain incentives are as
strong as the consumption smoothing motive and domestic investors choose not to change their
equity position. However, in states when the beliefs are \con¯rmed", the consumption smoothing
e®ect dominates and domestic investors decrease (increase) their demand for equity in response
to a negative (positive) transitory component shock.
When foreign investors turn pessimistic (optimistic) equity prices are driven below (above) the
\fundamentals price". In these periods, equity prices display swings that are not associated with
changes in productivity. Introduction of informational frictions produces not only endogenous
busts, but also booms in the equity market. Besides, informational frictions produce persistence
in response to transitory noise shocks. Investors' beliefs in one period are carried to the next and
2We borrow this terminology from Moore and Schaller (2002).
2used in the calculation of the next period's beliefs. If foreign investors turn pessimistic (optimistic)
as response to a misleading signal, it takes several periods for them to correct their beliefs. This
simple mechanism produces persistence of investors' con¯dence in the emerging economy. Finally,
due to the persistence of the productivity shocks, the e®ects of foreign investors' misperceptions
are ampli¯ed. The multiplier in this ampli¯cation process is increasing in the persistence of the
productivity shocks and decreasing in the risk free interest rate.
The assumption of superiority of domestic investors information relies on the fact that it
is costly for foreign investors to obtain country-speci¯c information and to keep up with the
developments in emerging economies due to idiosyncracies a®ecting ¯nancial markets in these
countries, i.e. institutions, policies, political factors, legal structure, etc. As a result, it might
be optimal for them not to \buy" this information.3 Calvo and Mendoza (2000) provide two
arguments for why it can be optimal for them not to buy this information. First, if short selling
positions are limited, the bene¯t of paying for costly information declines as the number of
emerging economies in which to invest increases. Second, managers of investment funds may
choose to mimic each others behavior instead of paying for costly information, if punishment for
poor performance is high.
Although both ¯nancial and informational frictions have been blamed for the ¯nancial crises
in the emerging markets, the research on quantifying the e®ects of informational frictions has been
limited. The literature on ¯nancial frictions often utilize collateral constraints such as Mendoza
and Smith (2004), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Paasche (2001) and others. Mendoza
and Smith (2004) have been successful in amplifying the shocks that have the magnitude of
a regular business cycle shock and producing collapses larger than the regular business cycles
by introducing an \occasionally binding" margin constraint. However, the margin constraint
becomes binding after a negative productivity shock. Our model is able to produce busts and
booms without referring to productivity shocks. It is su±cient for the foreign investors to observe
a noisy signal and turn pessimistic/optimistic about the economy. In addition, these constraints
only produce collapses, not booms, i.e. they work only in one direction. Our model works in
both directions which is consistent with the emerging market empirical regularities.
In the international ¯nance literature, shifts in investor con¯dence have usually been analyzed
3We do not however, explicitly model the foreign investors' decisions to be informed or to remain uninformed.
3within the context of currency crises, often using models that produce multiple equilibria.4 In
models with multiple equilibria, switches between a \good" equilibrium and a \bad" one are
interpreted as changes in investor con¯dence that are not necessarily induced by changes in eco-
nomic fundamentals.5 In contrast, we consider a single equilibrium model that can endogenously
produce shifts in foreign investors' con¯dence and switches between \good" states and \bad"
ones. Modelling shifts in investors con¯dence without referring to multiple equilibria o®ers sev-
eral advantages. For example, in our model we have de¯nite answers to when these shifts occur
and how long it takes for the market to recover after a bust, and ¯nally we can analyze the
dynamics during a transition from the bad state to the good one and vice versa. Moreover, in
the multiple equilibria models the busts and booms are \self-ful¯lling". This feature exists in our
model as well. In our model, due to misleading signals asset prices can bust or boom due to shifts
in foreign investors' expectations as well as due to changes in the fundamentals of the economy.
In addition to the literature on currency crises, recently, Gourinchas and Tornell (2003) and
Andersen and Beier (2005) utilize imperfect information and learning about persistent and tran-
sitory shocks in order to account for empirical regularities regarding exchange rate dynamics.
This paper's aim to model informational asymmetries to explain the crashes of asset prices in
emerging markets is in line with Calvo's analysis of the Russian crisis based on an informational-
frictions framework. When both informed (specialists) and uninformed investors operate in the
capital market, the uninformed face a signal extraction problem. In Calvo (1999), uninformed
investors are able to observe actions of the informed. However, if they observe the informed staying
out of the market, they cannot tell if the reason behind this action is an information about the
true returns of the capital market or margin calls on highly-leveraged informed investors. The
major di®erence between Calvo's work and this paper is the way we distinguish the investors in
terms of their information. Instead of the specialist vs. non-specialist distinction, we deal with
foreign and domestic investors.
The fact that domestic portfolio investors have an informational advantage over foreign port-
folio investors is also utilized by Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999). The authors distinguish between
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI) . FDI investors not only
4Morris and Shin (1998) demonstrate that unique equilibrium can be obtained when the speculators have noisy
information about the fundamentals.
5Masson (1999) surveys the literature on currency crises and multiple equilibria.
4have an informational advantage over foreign portfolio investors but also they are more informed
than domestic savers. They consider an economy with a large number of ex-ante identical domes-
tic ¯rms. Each of these ¯rms' productivity factor is random and independent across all ¯rms. In
their framework, there is no aggregate uncertainty since the productivity factor is idiosyncratic.
In contrast, this paper emphasizes aggregate uncertainty in an asymmetric information frame-
work thus, di®erentiating from that of Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999). Informational asymmetry
addressed in this paper stems from the foreign portfolio investors' lack of information regard-
ing the productivity of the whole economy, not regarding the productivity of individual ¯rms
operating in the country.
Modelling dividends as noisy signals has been widely used in the literature. An incomplete
list of authors utilizing this modelling strategy is: Wang (1994), who analyzes trading volume
in stock markets, Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2004), investigating the e®ects of investor
sophistication on international equity °ows, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2004), explaining U.S.
business cycle asymmetries in an RBC framework with asymmetric learning and Moore and
Schaller (2002) emphasizing the time varying response of investment to interest rate shocks.
Empirical evidence about informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors
is mixed. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2000), Hau (2001), Dvorak (2001) and Chan, Menkveld and Yang
(2003) and Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) ¯nd that domestic investors have more valuable
information compared to foreign counterparts using data from Korea, Germany, Indonesia and
China. On the other hand, Seasholes (2000), Grinblatt and Kelahaiju (2000) Wang and Stulz
(1997) and Chui and Kwok (1998) use data for Taiwan, Finland, Japan and China and ¯nd
that foreigners have more valuable information since they have the expertise that the domestic
investors lack.
Empirical evidence with low frequency data is provided by Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider
(2004) who build a structural model in order to match dividends and equity °ows (from the U.S.
to the other G7 countries) data and estimate the degree of informational heterogeneity within
and across the countries. One of their main ¯ndings is that within country heterogeneity is more
pronounced compared to the cross country heterogeneity for their sample. However, for the case
of Italy, the cross country heterogeneity is found to be almost as large as the within country.
They also ¯nd that an average U.S. investor is less informed than an average local investor for all
6 countries. This informational di®erence is slight for Canada but much larger for Italy. Although
5this study focuses on developed markets, it provides important results for our purposes. Given
that an average U.S. investor is less informed than an average local Canadian investor, we feel safe
to assume that a representative foreign investor is less informed than a representative domestic
investor in an emerging economy.
A study that provides empirical evidence on the informational asymmetry between foreign
and domestic investors focusing on emerging markets is Frankel and Schmukler (1996). They
¯nd that the Mexican stock market prices Granger cause the country fund prices that are usually
traded by foreign investors. They analyze the period before the Mexican crisis and show that
domestic investors were the ¯rst to pull out of the equity market and interpret this ¯nding as an
evidence for domestic investors being better informed than their foreign counterparts.
Despite the mixed empirical evidence, in the ¯rst speci¯cation this paper assumes that foreign
investors are less informed. However, we claim that the results presented are robust to this
assumption. If there exists a group of less informed investors (whether these are domestic or
foreign), equity prices will be sensitive to the noisy signals received by this group. Hence, prices
will bust (boom) in periods when the noise has low (high) realizations. In order to analyze
whether the heterogeneity of information plays a critical role in the model, we present a scenario
where both sets of investors are imperfectly informed solving the same signal extraction problem.
Like their foreign counterparts, domestic investors over or under-estimate the true productivity
depending on the noisiness of the signals. We ¯nd that the results that we present in this paper
survive under this alternative speci¯cation of the information structure. The major di®erence
of this alternative set-up is equity investment becomes riskier for domestic investors due to the
additional uncertainty even though the underlying process generating the dividends is the same
as the asymmetric information set-up. Therefore, on average, domestic investors hold less equity.
However, since the domestic investors also fall into the same misperceptions, the e®ects of the
noisy signals on the economy are even stronger than the asymmetric information set-up.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the model (i.e.
domestic and foreign investors' problems, dividends, informational structure); Section 3 analyzes
the model; Section 4 explains the computational strategies used to solve the model numerically;
Section 5 reviews the calibration exercise; Section 6 shows and explains the simulation results;
Section 7 investigates the symmetry of the cycles and further analyzes a case with miracles causing
crises and Section 8 concludes.
62 Model
We consider a framework with two di®erent classes of agents, foreign and domestic investors,
which are identical within each class. They operate simultaneously in the equity market of
the emerging economy. The fraction of foreign investors is ! and that of domestic investors is
1 ¡ !. The domestic households make consumption and equity holding decisions conditional on
the true value of the productivity in order to maximize their expected present discounted value
of utility. Foreign investors, however, choose their equity positions in order to maximize the
expected present discounted value of pro¯ts conditional on their \belief" productivity. They do
not observe the true realization of the stochastic productivity shock that contains information
relevant for forecasting the returns from equity. However, they observe dividends which is a noisy
signal about the true value of productivity. They form their beliefs as a solution to the signal
extraction problem they face. In addition, they face trading costs associated with operating in
the equity market.
2.1 Domestic Households' Problem
Each period, for given equity prices qt, the domestic households choose consumption ct and equity
holdings ®t+1 in order to maximize their expected life-time utility of consumption conditional on














1¡¾ , the parameter ¾ is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, Ii
t is the information
set of domestic investors as of time t and is de¯ned as:
Ii
t = fdt;dt¡1;:::;zt;zt¡1;:::g (3)
At the beginning of each period, productivity shocks are realized and dividends are deter-
mined. Households make their decisions after observing the dividends as well as the true value
of productivity. The optimality conditions characterizing the household's decisions are:
¯tu0(ct) ¡ ¸t = 0 (4)
7¡¸tqt + Et[¸t+1(dt+1 + qt+1)] = 0 (5)
where ¸t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Equations (4)
and (5) equate the expected marginal cost and bene¯ts of consumption and equity investment








Dividends are determined exogenously as follows:
dt = zt + ´t (7)
There are two types of uncertainty associated with dividends: persistent aggregate productivity
shocks z and noise in the form of transitory additive Normal i.i.d. shocks ´ with mean 0 and
variance ¾2
´; ´ » N(0;¾2
´). Aggregate productivity shocks z, follow a Markov process with 2
states and transition probability matrix ¼. We denote the values z can take as z 2 fzL;zHg.
2.3 Information Structure
We assume foreign investors know the true distribution governing the productivity shocks z, the
noise ´ and they observe the dividends d at the beginning of each period. However, they do not
observe the current or past values of the productivity shock z and the noise ´.7 Foreign investors
use the information revealed by the value of the dividends in order to infer the realization of
productivity shock in the current period8:
e zt = E[ztjIu
t ] (8)
where Iu
t includes the history of the dividends observed by the foreign investors:
Iu
t = fdt;dt¡1;:::g (9)
6We discuss the role of the expectation operator and the information structure in Section 2.3.
7One can think that they observe the productivity with such a long lag that the information is not useful for
predicting the current value any more.
8One can model publicly observed signals revealing information rather than dividends. However, in such a
set-up both the dividends and the public signals would reveal information since dividends are usually thought to
be a function of the fundamentals of the economy. Our current speci¯cation is simpler and we would have similar
dynamics if we had added public signals.
8Since the information sets of investors can be hierarchically ranked (foreign investors' infor-
mation set is a subset of domestic investors', Iu ½ Ii for 8 t), we do not face an \in¯nite regress
problem", i.e. agents do not forecast the forecasts of other agents avoiding an in¯nite dimensional
belief space.
The belief e zt is formed by updating the previous period's belief e zt¡1 using Bayes' rule, similar
to Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2003) and Moore and Schaller (2002).
The Bayesian updating rule is:
Pr(zt = zHj­t) =
f(dtjzt = zH)Pr(zt = zHj­t¡1)
f(dtjzt = zL)Pr(zt = zLj­t¡1) + f(dtjzt = zH)Pr(zt = zHj­t¡1)
(10)
where f is the conditional normal probability density that can be written as:








(dt ¡ zH)2g (11)
Equation (10) is used to update the probability assigned to being in the high productivity
state incorporating the additional information revealed by dt at the beginning of period t. The
priors that will be used in period t + 1 for updating beliefs are obtained by simply adjusting for
the probability of change of state from period t to t+1 using the Markov transition matrix known
by foreign investors. That is:
Pr(zt+1 = zHj­t) = Pr(zt = zHj­t)¦(H;H) + Pr(zt = zLj­t)¦(L;H) (12)
where ¦(i;j) stands for the probability of transiting from state i to state j.
Once the posteriors of the current period are calculated, the expected value of z conditional
on the information available is9:
e zt = Pr(zt = zLj­t)zL + Pr(zt = zHj­t)zH (13)
Equation (13) has 2 important implications. First, since the probabilities assigned to each
state lie in the interval [0;1], beliefs are convex combinations of low and high values of productivity.
As is obvious in equation (13), foreign investors take an expectation, which is a weighted average
of the possible values that the productivity shock can take.10 Therefore, beliefs are always higher
than the low value of productivity and lower than the high value, zL · e z · zH. This implies
9Equations (10), (12) and (13) follow from Hamilton (1989).
10The weights are the probabilities assigned to being in each state.
9that agents never underestimate the true productivity when the productivity is low and never
overestimate when the true productivity is high. This is an unappealing feature of learning about
2 point discrete Markov processes. If we increase the points of the Markov process we would get
this feature only for the lowest and the highest states.11 Also, as a result of this limitation, the
unconditional standard deviation of beliefs is always less than or equal to that of productivity.
Second, beliefs are su±cient to backtrack the probabilities assigned to each state. The assump-
tion that provides this simpli¯cation is having 2 exogenous states for the productivity shocks.
This simpli¯cation is crucial for the numerical analysis since probabilities assigned to each state
are continuous endogenous state variables for the problem. Given the computational di±culty
of handling continuous state variables, we assume 2 states for productivity shocks and carry e z
as the state variable that is su±cient for backtracking the probabilities assigned to each state of
productivity.
Contrary to standard models with information where prices play a dual role; market clearing
and revealing information, in this paper we abstract from the informational role of prices.12 This
is implicit in the belief updating equations where the only signals considered are the realizations of
dividends. This assumption is made simply due to the di±culty of solving asymmetric information
problems with learning from endogenous variables that do not have a well de¯ned distribution
which is the case with CRRA utility functions.13
In our set-up, if the prices had an informational role, they would be fully revealing. In
models where prices have an informational role, there are several modelling strategies that make
prices only partially revealing. Some of these strategies are introducing noise traders (as done in
most of the papers in the literature) or a private investment opportunity available only to the
informed investors where the returns from this investment is unknown to the uninformed ones.
Wang (1994) builds a model with asymmetric information between two sets of investors where
informed investors have a private investment opportunity. In Wang's work, equilibrium price
11Despite this limitation, we choose to have 2 points for reasons discussed in the following paragraph.
12In section 6.3 we consider the case where both investors solve the same signal extraction problem. In that set-up
we do not face the problem of prices revealing information and we ¯nd that the results do not di®er signi¯cantly.
13To our knowledge, the only work done in solving asymmetric information problems with general utility functions
is Bernardo and Judd (2000). Their method includes solution of system of non-linear equations where the number
of equations in the system increase dramatically with the number of state variables and the required accuracy of
the solution.
10has an informational role and is a linear function14 of the return from the private investment
opportunity and the persistent component of dividends (which is what the uniformed wish to
know about) as well as the uninformed investors' beliefs . Learning from the equilibrium prices
can be handled just like other linear and normally distributed signals.
When prices are partially revealing as in Wang (1994), prices act as a device that transmits
information from the informed to the uninformed lowering the informational gap between the
two. Prices not having an informational role implies that this gap will be higher compared to an
identical model with prices revealing information. Our strategy to overcome this problem is to
calibrate our model in a way that dividends are `very' informative and hence the informational
gap between the two investors is small. Therefore, even if we considered a set-up where prices
were partially revealing, the beliefs would deviate from the true productivity almost as much as
they do in the current set-up.15
An important ¯nding of Wang (1994) for the purpose of our paper is that prices are sensitive
to the misperceptions of the uninformed investors. As long as prices are not fully revealing,
which is the case even in the developed equity markets, equity prices will be sensitive to the
misperceptions of the uninformed investors. This is su±cient for us to claim that our results
would hold in a set-up with partially revealing prices.
2.4 Foreign Investors' Problem
As in Mendoza and Smith (2004), foreign investors choose f®¤
t+1g1
0 in order to maximize the


















t)2 is the total trading cost associated with buying and selling equities in the emerging
14The model is solved analytically under very speci¯c assumptions such as CARA utility, Kalman ¯lters and
Normally distributed returns.
15Another argument that can be brought up on this issue is that in emerging equity markets, prices can be
considered to be less informative compared to the developed markets.
11economies.16 The ¯rst order condition of the foreign investors' problem is:
qt(1 + a(®t+1 ¡ ®t)) = R¡1E[dt+1 + qt+1(1 + a(®t+2 ¡ ®t+1))jIu
t ] (15)












t, called the belief price, is the expected present discounted value of future dividends conditional
on the current belief about productivity:
qb
t = E[R¡1dt+1 + R¡2dt+2 + R¡3dt+3 + :::jIu
t ] (17)
Intuitively, foreign investors partially adjust their equity holdings depending on the gap between
the market price qt and their belief price qb
t. How much of this gap is re°ected in the equity
position is determined by 1=a.17
3 Analysis of the Model
There are two types of uncertainty faced by domestic households: the evolution of the true pro-
ductivity and beliefs of foreign investors. The former is an exogenous Markov process with a
distribution known to both domestic and foreign investors. The latter enters the domestic in-
vestors' problem since the introduction of imperfect information to the foreign investors' problem
has implications for the domestic investors' problem as well. The beliefs of foreign investors a®ect
equity prices and are persistent. They contain information for forecasting next period's prices.
Domestic investors treat these beliefs as a state variable and form expectations about the fol-
lowing period's beliefs. In fact, due to their advantage in separating the persistent shocks from





t] ¡ e zt+1
¤
< E [E[e zt+1jIu
t ] ¡ e zt+1] (18)
16The trading cost associated with buying and selling equity is modelled in quadratic form as in Heaton and
Lucas (1996), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and Smith (2004).
17In Mendoza and Smith (2004), the lower the trading costs the smaller the crash in equity prices however, in
our set-up low trading costs (low a) imply that the changes in beliefs are re°ected more to the demand functions
of foreign investors inducing larger busts and booms in equity prices.
12To conclude, domestic investors have an informational advantage in both of the stochastic com-
ponents a®ecting future dividends and prices.








Conditional Densities of Dividends, signal−to−noise=0.25 
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Conditional Densities of Dividends, signal−to−noise=1
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Figure 1: Density of d conditional on z for signal-to-noise ratios of 0.25 and 1.
We denote the evolution of foreign investors' beliefs as e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1). When domes-
tic households make their decisions at the beginning of time t, dt+1 is not known whereas its
distribution conditional on zt+1 is known. Figure (1) plots these conditional distributions for
signal-to-noise ratios of 0.25 and 1, respectively. As the signal-to-noise ratio decreases, the distri-
butions of dividends conditional on the high and low productivity overlap more and as a result
dividends become less informative. In ¯gure (1) most of the conditional density is concentrated
around their means when the signal-to-noise ratio is 1. As the ¾´ decreases (or as the signal-to-
noise ratio increases) these two conditional densities become more separated and in limit as ¾´
approaches to zero, informational asymmetry totally disappears.
In ¯gure (2), we plot e zt+1 as a function of dt+1 for a high (dashed line) and a low (solid
line) value of e zt. We can make two remarks about this plot. First, the probability assigned to a
particular state can be equal to one, that is, investors can be \fully sure" about the true state,
if and only if as limdt+1 ¡! ¨1. Since the probability of an extreme realization of dividends is
low18, investors will at most be \almost sure" about being in a particular state.
Second, the elasticity of e zt+1 with respect to dt+1 varies depending on e zt. When the investors
assign a high probability to being in the low state (e zt is low), a low realization of dt+1 \con¯rms"
the beliefs and e zt+1 changes only marginally. However, if a high dt+1 is observed, the beliefs of
18Recall that dt+1 is normally distributed, hence extreme realizations correspond to the tails of this distribution.
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Beliefs as a function of dividends
low current beliefs
high current beliefs
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Figure 2: The following period's beliefs e zt+1 as a function of next period's dividends dt+1 for a high and
a low value of current beliefs e zt.
investors are \challenged" and there is a large adjustment in the next period's beliefs. Most of
the action takes place when the beliefs are challenged.
In order to see this clearly, consider the following scenario. Let's assume that the true produc-
tivity is low and the signals have no noise. Foreign investors easily ¯gure out the true productivity.
The beliefs of the foreign investors are low, as shown with the solid line in ¯gure (2). If the foreign
investors observe a noisy signal in the following period, the response of the beliefs to this signal is
minimal (the solid line within the band is °at). If instead, the foreign investors receive a sequence
of positive signals before the negative one, even though the true productivity does not change,
their con¯dence builds up. As investors receive these positive signals, gradually the curve shifts
to the left (dashed line). When the economy ends up in such a state, the response to a small
negative signal is large (the dashed line is steep within the band). Therefore, the preceding pos-
itive signals can move the economy to a vulnerable state in which a large downward adjustment
eventually gets triggered.
In ¯gure (3) we plot the numerical derivative of Á(e zt;dt+1) with respect to dt+1 around dt+1 =
zL as a function of e zt. As can be seen from the ¯gure, this derivative is convex. Intuitively,
the response of the beliefs to a negative signal increases at an increasing rate with the degree of
con¯dence obtained prior to the negative signal.








Figure 3: The derivative of following period's beliefs e zt+1 with respect to dividends as a function of e zt.
3.1 AR(1) Speci¯cation
In order to obtain an expression linking the gap between the true productivity to beliefs to the
gap between the fundamentals price and belief price, we consider the case where zt+1 = ½zt+²t+1,
½ 2 (0;1) and ² » N(¹;¾2
²) in this subsection.
In the absence of informational asymmetries and trading costs, the equilibrium price would
be equal to the fundamentals price de¯ned as:
q
f
t = E[R¡1dt+1 + R¡2dt+2 + R¡3dt+3 + :::jIi
t] (19)
which is the expected present discounted value of future dividends conditional on the correct
information about the current state of the economy. If there were only informational asymmetries
without trading costs, equilibrium price would become the \belief" price de¯ned in equation (17).
Adding trading costs to the model lowers the demands of the foreign investors thus, forcing the
equilibrium price to be lower than the belief price.



























15Any gap between the belief and true productivity gets multiplied with the term ½=(R ¡ ½) and
is re°ected to the decisions of the foreign investors.19 When ½=(R ¡ ½) > 1 any misperception
about productivity is ampli¯ed and re°ected in the foreign investors' problem. This is true when





The expression ½=(R ¡ ½) is increasing in ½ and decreasing in R. Intuitively, the higher ½,
the larger the e®ect of current z on the future z's and the larger the gap between belief and
fundamental price. Higher ½ implies that the misperceptions of foreign investors have a larger
impact on the decision to choose their equity position. Higher interest rates however, reduce the
amount of the di®erence between belief and true productivity transmitted to belief prices simply
due to higher interest rates inducing higher discounting of future dividends.
3.2 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this economy is determined by allocations f®t+1;ct;®¤
t+1g and
prices fqtg such that: domestic households maximize U subject to the budget constraint taking the
equity prices and the evolution of beliefs as given, foreign investors maximize the expected present
discounted value of future pro¯ts conditional on their beliefs about the state of productivity taking
the equity prices as given, and the goods and equity markets clear.
4 Computation
The dynamic programming representation of the domestic households problem is:
V (®; e z;´;z) = max
®0;c
u(c) + ¯E[V (®0;e z0;´;z0jIi)]
s:t:
c + ®0q = ®(q + d)
and
e z0 = Á(e z;d0)
(22)
for given prices q. In order to solve the problem numerically, we substitute for consumption using
the budget constraint, substitute for e z0 using the evolution of beliefs and rewrite the problem for
19Their beliefs about productivity enter their problem only through belief price.
16the high productivity state as follows:
V (®; e z;´;zH) = max







Solution algorithm includes the following steps:
1. Discretize the state space. We equally space N=102 grids for ® and K=40 grids for e z in the
intervals [:90;1:00] and [0:1;0:102] respectively.
2. Evaluate the evolution of foreign investors' beliefs e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1) using equations (10)-
(13).20
3. For a conjectured pricing function qold(®; e z;´;z), solve the dynamic programming problem
using value function iterations in order to get ®0(®; e z;´;z) and c(®; e z;´;z). To evaluate the
integration on the right hand side of the Bellman equation, we use Gaussian quadratures with 20
quadrature nodes.
4. Calculate foreign investors' demand function using domestic investors' equity demand function
and the market clearing condition in equity market, !®¤ + (1 ¡ !)® = 1.
5. Using equation (16) calculate new prices qnew(®; e z;´;z).
6. Update the conjectured prices with (weight)qold(®; e z;´;z)+(1¡weight)qnew(®; e z;´;z) where
weight is a constant that is less than but close to 1 in order to dampen hog cycles.
7. Iterate prices until convergence and get equilibrium equity prices q(®; e z;´;z).
To check the accuracy of the solution to the dynamic programming problem, we evaluate
Euler equation residuals as described in Judd (1992). In order to do so, we solve for ^ c in the
following equation:
qtu0(^ ct) = ¯Et[(qt+1 + dt+1)u0(ct+1)] (24)
Intuitively, we solve for the consumption function that exactly satis¯es the Euler equation implied
by the solution of the dynamic programming problem. Then, we calculate 1 ¡ (^ ct=ct) which is a
unitless measure of error. We ¯nd that the average Euler equation error (excluding the corner
solutions) is 0:000459 for low degrees of informational asymmetry and as high as 0:0084 for
20Domestic investors' and foreign investors' evaluate the same evolution for beliefs but their expectations of the
next periods beliefs are di®erent. Domestic investors' expectations about e zt+1 are more precise than the foreigners'
since domestic investors can calculate the distribution of dt+1 conditional on the true zt.
17signal-to-noise ratio of 0.25.21
Euler equation errors do not include the errors from the price iteration since Euler equation
holds for any pricing function, not only the equilibrium price. As a measure for the accuracy
of the equilibrium price, we report the tolerance of the price iteration. Tolerance is de¯ned as
the maximum of the absolute value of the di®erence between prices evaluated in the last two
consecutive iterations, maxfjqnew ¡ qoldjg. We iterate prices until tolerance is less than 0.0001.
5 Calibration
The parameter values used for the numerical solution are f¯ = 0:97;¾ = 1:1g for domestic
households preferences, fR = 1:03g for the risk free world interest rate, fa = 0:001;µ = 0:1g for
foreign investors trading costs, ! = 0:5 for the fraction of foreign investors, f¾´ = 0:0005;0:001g
for the standard deviation of the additive i.i.d. shocks to dividends.22
The values for the productivity shock are fzH;zLg = f0:1;0:1+0:002g. These possible values
and the transition probability matrix approximate a Normal AR(1) process zt+1 = (0:0126) +
(0:8757)zt + "t+1 where std(") = 4:7881e ¡ 004.
6 Simulation
6.1 Full Information
In Figure (4), we plot simulated equity prices and productivity without informational frictions.
Clearly, the swings in equilibrium equity prices match the swings in productivity and shocks to
the transitory component of dividends have minimal e®ects on prices. A negative noise shock
lowers the wealth of the domestic investors. In order to smooth consumption, domestic investors
reduce their demand for equity, hence in equilibrium equity prices fall. However, this e®ect on
prices is very small and not even visible in the ¯gure. Foreign investors enjoy higher pro¯ts and
respond to this shock only by responding to the slight drop in equilibrium price.
A nice feature of the model is its ability to account for the high volatility of equity prices
relative to productivity as can be seen in ¯gure (4). Given that productivity shocks are persistent
21Judd (1992) calls this measure a \bounded rationality measure" and interprets an error of 0:000459 as $4 error
made per $10000 expenditure.
22These standard deviations imply signal-to-noise ratios of 0.5 and 0.25 respectively.





































Figure 4: Full information































Impulse Response to a Negative Transitory Shock 
price
consumption
dom. inv. eq. holdings
Figure 5: Impulse response to a two standard deviation negative transitory component shock
and this is common knowledge among investors, investors expect dividends to display persistence
as well. The demand functions of domestic and foreign investors for equity depend on the expected
present discounted value of future dividends. Therefore, expectations of higher dividends increase
19the demand for equity resulting in an increase in equity prices. This is a standard result in asset
pricing models where prices depend on future dividends.
In order to analyze the role of transitory component shocks in the full information economy,
we plot the impulse response functions to a two standard deviation negative transitory component
shock in Figure (5). Consumption and equity holdings of domestic investors fall due to the wealth
e®ect mentioned above. The fall in prices however, is negligible.
6.2 Asymmetric Information






































In this section we introduce informational asymmetry. The parameters of the model and the
size of the shocks are the same as the impulse responses demonstrated for the full information
case. In ¯gure (6) we plot simulated dividends, productivity and prices when the signal-to-noise
ratio is 0.5.23 Although beliefs usually follow the productivity closely, there are signi¯cant dis-
23We plot the stationary distributions of beliefs for signal-to-noise ratios of 0.5 and 0.25 in ¯gure (13). As the
signal-to-noise ratio falls, the signals become less informative and hence the probability of beliefs being close to the
true productivity falls.











































































dom. inv. eq. holdings
Figure 8: Impulse responses to a two standard deviation negative noise shock, signal-to-noise=0.25
crepancies between the two. For example, around period 15, misled by the high realizations of
dividends, foreign investors turn optimistic about the economy although the true productivity is
low. In ¯gure (7) we plot the same series with a lower signal-to-noise ratio. The magnitude of
21discrepancies between belief and the true productivity increase with the degree of informational
asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors. In response to su±ciently low (high) real-
izations of the transitory component shocks, the economy experiences equity price busts (booms)
that can be as large as the busts (booms) caused by productivity shocks.
Figure (8) shows the response of beliefs, prices, domestic investors' equity holdings and con-
sumption to a 2 standard deviation noise shock to dividends. In period 3, foreign investors are
optimistic about the economy. The negative shock in period 4 is su±cient for them to turn pes-
simistic and lower their demand. We ¯nd that the domestic investors however, do not change
their equity positions since there are opposing forces that a®ect their decision that we explain
soon.
Domestic investors' equity demand decision is a®ected through 2 channels in response to a
negative transitory shock. The ¯rst one is due to lower dividend income. Negative transitory
shocks decrease dividends and hence the wealth of domestic investors. This lowers the demand
of domestic investors. This is the basic consumption smoothing e®ect and is present in the full
information case as well.
The second e®ect is the capital gain opportunity for domestic investors using their informa-
tional advantage. When the equity is undervalued (overvalued) due to misperceptions of foreign
investors, domestic investors know that this is a result of a transitory shock and in fact, prices
will correct in the following period. As a result, they would like to use the opportunity to buy
(sell) equity when the prices are low (high) due to pessimism (optimism) of foreign investors.
In the numerical exercise, we ¯nd that the relative magnitudes of the consumption smoothing
motive and the capital gain incentives vary depending on whether the transitory shocks con¯rm
or challenge the beliefs. If a negative transitory shock challenges the beliefs, then there is a larger
adjustment in beliefs as well as prices. In these cases, the potential capital gain is high and the
capital gain incentives are as large as the consumption smoothing incentives. Overall, domestic
investors do not change their equity positions. In cases when the transitory shocks con¯rm
the beliefs, neither beliefs nor the prices change signi¯cantly and the consumption smoothing
e®ect dominates. Hence, they lower their demand for equity in response to a negative transitory
component shock.24
24If there is a negative transitory component shock, equity is underpriced and domestic investors want to dissave
in order to smooth consumption. We conjecture that if risk free bonds were available to the domestic investors in
22Comparing ¯gures (5) and (8) we see that the drop in consumption is larger in the asymmetric
information case than the full information scenario. Since the domestic investors do not change
their equity positions in response to the negative transitory shock, the shock is fully transmitted
to consumption. There is a large price change due to this negative transitory shock.
After a two standard deviation shock foreign investors turn pessimistic and it takes about
four periods for the e®ects of the shock to die o®. Without imposing persistence exogenously,
this informational friction is su±cient for the model to display persistence. The belief updating
structure is the key element in the model that induces this persistence; previous periods beliefs
are used in order to calculate the priors of the following period.
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Figure 9: Static Analysis
We demonstrate the simple mechanism driving the movements in asset prices and equity
holdings in ¯gure (9) in a static framework. This ¯gure explains the large price adjustments and
small changes in the equity positions of investors in response to a negative transitory shock. The
¯rst shift (from DOM to DOM0) of the domestic investors' demand is due to the consumption
smoothing e®ect, the second one is due to their incentives to make capital gains (from DOM0
addition to equity, they would be able to sell bonds for consumption smoothing purposes and they would choose
to be net buyers of equity since equity is underpriced fully exploiting the capital gain opportunity. With risk free
bonds, in response to a negative transitory shock, domestic investors would increase their demand for equity while
foreign investors decrease. We conjecture that the adjustments in the equity holdings of the domestic investors
would be larger.
23to DOM00). Foreign investors' demand clearly shifts down (from FOR to FOR0) as they turn
pessimistic. The overall result is that prices drop sharply however, equity positions of investors
do not change signi¯cantly.
6.3 Symmetric Information
In this section, we drop the assumption of asymmetric information and assume that both investors
are equally uninformed. That is, domestic investors share the same information set with the
foreign investors, and none of the investors observe the true values of the productivity. All
investors solve the exact same signal extraction problem using the same signals (dividends). The
main idea of this exercise is to investigate whether the results for the asymmetric information
case hinge on the informational heterogeneity of investors. In other words, do the results change
when the investors are equally uninformed and they \agree" on the state of the economy although
this \agreed" state can be wrong?
In this set-up, dynamic programming problem of the domestic investors is:




Pr(z = zH)¦(H;H) + Pr(z = zL)¦(L;H)
¤Z
V (®0;Á(e z;d0);d0)f(d0jz0 = zH)dd0
+ ¯
£
Pr(z = zH)¦(H;L) + Pr(z = zL)¦(L;L)
¤Z
V (®0;Á(e z;d0);d0)f(d0jz0 = zL)dd0g
(25)
for given prices q(®; e z;d) where Pr(z = zH) is the probability assigned to productivity being
high conditional on the information set. Computationally, the main di®erences between the
asymmetric information set-up and this set-up are the true productivity is not a state variable
and the probabilities assigned to each state are used in the calculation of E[V (®0;e z0;d0)].
Not being able distinguish the transitory shocks from the permanent ones makes the equity
investment riskier for the domestic investors. On average, domestic investors demand less equity.
In response to a positive transitory component shock, the domestic investors would like to buy
equity in order to smooth consumption. However, their incentives to increase equity holdings
are weaker than the asymmetric information set-up since they face the risk of being misled by a
noisy signal. On average, their demand for equity is lower than the asymmetric information set-
up. Unlike the asymmetric information setting, domestic investors do not have an informational
advantage over their foreign counterparts and hence, they cannot make capital gains by better
predicting the following period's prices.




































dom. inv. eq. holdings
Figure 10: Impulse responses to a two standard deviation negative noise shock, symmetric information
case signal-to-noise=0.25
Comparing ¯gures (8) and (10) we see that dynamics of the model are fairly similar except
the fact that price fall is slightly larger in the symmetric information scenario. This larger price
drop can be explained by lower demand of domestic investors due increased riskiness.
7 From Miracles to Crises
In this section, we ¯rst compare the e®ects of positive and negative one period transitory com-
ponent shocks of equal magnitude and then simulate an economy where a small negative shock
can trigger a large downward adjustment in prices.
In our model, a negative and a positive shock of equal magnitude have fully symmetric e®ects
on equity prices as displayed in ¯gure (7). The reason behind this is the fact that there is no
explicit mechanism in the model that will induce di®erent dynamics for positive and negative
signals.
An interesting observation from ¯gure (7) is the cycle produced in response to a given negative
(positive) shock is asymmetric in the sense that the initial bust (boom) is prompt and the cor-
rection afterwards is gradual for shocks larger than one standard deviation. A negative (positive)
large transitory component shock induces abrupt under(over)-pricing of equity and it takes up to
5 periods for the e®ects of the shocks to be absorbed. This observation however, does not hold
25for a shock that is as small as 0.7 standard deviation. The e®ects of a 0.7 standard deviation
shock die out rapidly in one period and the asymmetry observed in response to larger shocks is
absent for this magnitude.










































































Figure 11: Price responses to one period positive and negative transitory component shocks.
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trans. shock
Figure 12: Impulse responses to 10 consecutive 0.7 std. transitory component shocks, signal-to-noise=0.25
To sum up, our model is able to produce abrupt falls and gradual recoveries in response to
relatively large and negative transitory component shocks to dividends. One criticism of this
result could be that emerging economies are not necessarily subject to large and negative shocks
and in fact, usually fairly small shocks trigger large adjustments. We consider the following
scenario in order to demonstrate a case where subsequent small shocks move the economy to
26a vulnerable state. As this small positive shock comes to an end, an abrupt fall in prices is
triggered.25 With this exercise we intend to \replicate" a crisis in the sense that the economy
enjoys a period of increasing investor con¯dence followed by a sudden loss of this con¯dence.
In ¯gure (12), we plot the simulation results of this scenario. The consecutive positive (but
as small as 0.7 standard deviation) signals start from period 3 and continue until 13. As foreign
investors observe these slightly positive signals, they gradually build their con¯dence about the
economy. In period 14, as positive signals come to an end, equity prices fall sharply. In fact,
the trigger for the price drop is a change as in the transitory component which is small as a
0.7 standard deviation. However, this is enough for the investors to lose their con¯dence built
in 10 periods. This exercise is an example where the vulnerability of the economy is in fact a
consequence of the miracle period.
In conclusion, our model can produce abrupt adjustments in prices when (a) small positive
transitory component shocks gradually increase investor con¯dence and prices fall sharply as
these positive signals come to an end, (b) in the absence of preceding positive signals, the prices
can fall sharply in response to a large negative signal and the recovery is gradual as displayed in
¯gure (7).
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed an equilibrium asset pricing model with informational frictions in the
form of asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors where foreign investors
have imperfect information regarding the true state of the economy. The model is able to account
for the vulnerability of emerging economies after a period of high investor con¯dence and high
asset prices. In addition, the model displays a disconnect between country fundamentals and
asset prices, that is, the economy can have busts (booms) in equity markets even though the
fundamentals of the economy are strong (weak). Asset prices display persistence in response to
transitory shocks and the e®ects of the investors' misperceptions are ampli¯ed.
We believe this paper sheds light on the incentives of emerging countries for following non-
25This is similar in spirit with the second generation models of currency crises where the model displays multiple
equilibria for a set of values of the fundamentals and the economy is \ripe for attacks" for this range of the
fundamentals.
27transparent policies. As we show in the paper, informational frictions that stem from opaque
policies induce overpricing of assets in addition to underpricing. Given the risk aversion of
domestic investors in this model, we can claim that the losses from a price fall will outweigh
the gains from an equal amount of rise. However, if we were to add short-sighted policy-makers
or some other irrationality, we could potentially show that it might be optimal for emerging
economies to follow opaque policies.
Although the informational frictions introduced in this paper can produce large busts and
booms in asset prices, there is a °aw. The booms and busts produced due to shifts in investor
con¯dence are not larger than the business cycles. There are several modelling strategies to
overcome this problem. One, and maybe the most promising, strategy would be introducing the
informational frictions in a set-up like Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) where there are trend shocks
to productivity. Alternatively, we can interpret the bad (good) states of the economy as crisis
(non-crisis) rather than low (high) productivity that are in the magnitude of business cycles. This
interpretation would potentially produce price adjustments as large as the ones observed during
emerging market crises.
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Figure 13: Stationary distribution of beliefs, signal-to-noise=0.5, 0.25
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